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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the implications of price setting restric-
tions for the conduct of cyclical ﬁscal and monetary policy. We con-
sider an environment with monopolistic competitive ﬁrms, a shopping
time technology, prices set one period in advance, and government ex-
penditures that must be ﬁnanced with distortionary taxes. We show
that the sets of (frontier) implementable allocations are the same in-
depedendently of the degree of price stickiness. Furthermore, the sets
of policies that decentralize each allocation are also the same except in
the extreme cases of ﬂexible and sticky prices, where the sets are larger
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1but still include that common set of policies. In this sense we establish
an irrelevance or equivalence of environments. We also describe the
minimal set of instruments, in the diﬀerent environments, and thus
discuss equivalence and neutrality of ﬁscal and monetary instruments.
In particular we show that state contingent debt is not necessary, pro-
vided there are both consumption and labor income taxes.
Key words:O p t i m a l ﬁscal and monetary policy; sticky prices;
state-contingent debt.
JEL classiﬁcation: E31; E40; E52; E58; E62; E63.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this paper, we analyze the implications of price setting restrictions for the
conduct of cyclical ﬁscal and monetary policy. We consider as the bench-
mark a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium economy with a transactions
technology and monopolistic competitive ﬁrms that set prices contempora-
neously. This economy is compared to the same economy with prices set in
advance and to an economy with both ﬂexible and sticky ﬁrms. We charac-
terize the sets of ﬁscal and monetary policies and equilibrium allocations that
ﬁnance exogenous government expenditures, i.e., the sets of implementable
allocations and policies.
We assume that the government can choose state-contingent taxes on
consumption and labor income and can issue state-contingent debt. The
government can also raise taxes on proﬁts and wealth, and decide on mon-
etary policy in reaction to the contemporaneous shocks. We show that the
sets of eﬃcient (frontier) implementable allocations are the same indepen-
dently of the degree of price rigidity. Furthermore the sets of policies that
decentralize each eﬃcient allocation are also the same except in the extreme
cases of fully ﬂexible or sticky prices, where the sets are larger but still con-
tain that common set of policies. In this sense, we state, as the major result
of the paper, an equivalence, or irrelevance, of environments.
In the economies with both sticky and ﬂexible ﬁrms it is feasible to con-
duct policy so that the resulting allocations are the same as under ﬂexible
prices. Fiscal policy would coincide with the policy under ﬂexible prices and
monetary policy would undo the price rigidity, so that the price level would
not vary with the contemporaneous shocks. The planner can, therefore, un-
2der sticky prices, achieve the same level of welfare as under ﬂexible prices.1
The interesting question, however, is whether the price rigidity can be ex-
ploited to achieve allocations other than the ones under ﬂexible prices, that
may attain a higher level of welfare. It turns out, as we show in this paper,
that the policies and allocations with relative price distortions arising from
the price stickiness are dominated in welfare terms, for any preferences of the
government dependent on aggregate consumption and leisure. The frontier
of allocations coincides with the allocations that can be implemented un-
der ﬂexible prices. This result is in line with the one obtained by Diamond
and Mirrlees (1971) on optimal taxation of intermediate goods. According
to Diamond and Mirrlees if taxes on ﬁnal consumption goods are available,
intermediate goods should not be taxed.
The policies, common across environments, that decentralize each eﬃ-
cient allocation are characterized by the following principles: Monetary and
ﬁscal policy are conducted so that there are no surprises in prices, as under
sticky prices, and no surprises in markups, as under ﬂexible prices. Because
ﬁscal policy must be conducted as if prices were ﬂexible, the optimal tax-
ation results under ﬂexible prices of e.g. Lucas and Stokey (1983), Chari,
Christiano and Kehoe (1991) or Zhu (1992) hold also when there are sticky
prices. Because monetary policy must replicate the equilibria under ﬂexible
prices, it is eﬃcient to eliminate gaps, deﬁned as the deviations from the
allocation under ﬂexible prices for a given tax policy, also in a second best
environment.
Not all the policy instruments described above are necessary to obtain
the result of equivalence of environments. We determine the minimal sets
of instruments in the diﬀerent environments. We discuss equivalence and
neutrality of ﬁscal and monetary instruments. In particular, we show that,
if the government cannot issue state-contingent debt, it is still possible to
implement the common set of allocations with high volatility of consumption
and labor income taxes. Consumption taxes play the role that the price level
can costlessly play under ﬂexible prices of simulating state-contingent real
debt (see Chari, Christiano and Kehoe, 1991).
We also analyze the implications of restricting taxes to depend on the
same information set as the sticky prices. This restriction is not binding
when the optimal (Ramsey) policy is to set proportionate distortions, or
1This is the case in Adao, Correia and Teles (2000) that analyze the same environment
but consider only monetary policy.
3wedges, that do not depend on the contemporaneous shocks. In line with
previous literature, as in Lucas and Stokey (1983), Chari, Christiano and
Kehoe (1991), or Zhu (1992), we analyze the conditions for uniform taxation.
When the restriction is binding, the optimal policies and allocations will
depend on the degree of price rigidity. The equivalence of environments is
lost.
This paper extends two literatures. On one hand, it diverges from the
literature on Ramsey ﬁscal and monetary policies, such as Lucas and Stokey
(1983), Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1996), Correia and Teles (1996, 1999),
in that it considers nominal rigidities. Fiscal and monetary policy can, thus,
be interpreted as, short-run, stabilization policy.
On the other hand, the paper extends the literature on optimal monetary
policy under sticky prices by considering the joint decision of ﬁscal and mon-
etary policy. Most work in that literature either does not consider ﬁscal vari-
ables, such as Ireland (1996), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998b), Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1998a), or else assumes that government expenditures are ﬁnanced
by lump sum taxation as in Goodfriend and King (1997, 2000), King and
Wolman (1998), Kahn, King and Wolman (2000). Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999), Woodford (2001) and Gianonni and Woodford (2002), among oth-
ers, allow for subsidies, ﬁnanced by lump sum taxation, that eliminate the
distortions and achieve the ﬁrst best, in the absence of frictions. In Adão,
Correia and Teles (2000) government expenditures are ﬁnanced with lump
sum taxes, but it is not possible to subsidize labor to eliminate the markup
distortion. In that second best world, because of the non negativity of the
nominal interest rate, monetary policy generates optimal deviations from the
ﬂexible price allocation.
Siu (2001) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001b), even if diﬀerent in
purpose, make our same methodological step of considering both ﬁscal and
monetary policy in a world with nominal rigidities. Those papers are directly
related to Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991), where it is shown that the
Ramsey solution in Lucas and Stokey (1983) can be achieved without state
contingent debt. In Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991), optimal monetary
policy generates movements in the price level in reaction to shocks, therefore
aﬀecting the real value of nominal debt, and replicating state contingent
real debt. Quantitatively, the necessary volatility of the price level is very
high. Siu (2000) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001) compute the Ramsey
solution in a similar set up but consider in addition that it is costly to change
prices. They obtain that the beneﬁt of replicating state contingent debt is
4minimal relatively to the costs of changing prices. It turns out that the
presence of this trade-oﬀ hinges on the assumption that consumption taxes
are not available, as we show in this paper.
Finally, the paper also builds on Adao, Correia and Teles (1999), where
it is argued that the policies that decentralize the ﬂexible price, or portfo-
lios, allocations are independent of the degree of price, or portfolio, rigidity.
They conclude that if policy aimed at replicating the allocation under full
ﬂexibility, then the strength of the monetary transmission mechanism would
be irrelevant.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we describe the model. In
Section 3, we characterize the sets of implementable allocations and policies
and show that the degree of rigidity is irrelevant in determining both alloca-
tions and policies. In Section 4, we determine the minimal sets of instruments
that are necessary to obtain the equivalence results. Section 5 contains the
conclusions
2T h e m o d e l
The environment is a standard real business cycles model with labor only
to which we add restrictions on transactions and the setting of prices. The
agents are identical households, a continuum of ﬁrms indexed by i ∈ [0,1],
and a government. Each ﬁrm produces a distinct, perishable consumption
good, indexed by i. The production uses labor, according to a linear tech-
nology. We impose that transactions must be made according to a shopping
time technology as in Kimbrough (1983) and De Fiore and Teles (1998). A
fraction of ﬁrms are restricted to set prices one period in advance. Govern-
ment purchases are exogenous and the tax instruments are consumption taxes
τc
t ≥− 1, taxes on labor income τw
t ≤ 1, taxes on proﬁts τd
t ≤ 1,t h a tm a y
be state-contingent. We also consider an initial nominal wealth tax L ≤ 1.
Money supply and nominal interest rates are also state-contingent. State-
contingent nominal debt can be used to smooth proportionate distortions
over time and across states. This is the benchmark for the policy instru-
ments. Further along the paper we analyze whether any of these instruments
is redundant.
The state of the economy is represented by the random variable σt ∈
Σt. There are government purchases shocks, Gt = G(σt), and productivity
shocks, st = s(σt).


















,θ > 1. (2)
They start period t with wealth Wt, and decide to buy money balances
Mt. They also buy Bh
t units of money in nominal bonds that pay RtBh
t
units of money one period later; and Zh
t+1 units of state-contingent nominal
securities, that cost zt+1 in units of currency today, and each of them pays
one unit of money at the beginning of period t +1in a particular state.




t)Pt and shopping time Ns
t must be used to purchase
consumption, Ct, according to the transactions technology, as in Kimbrough
















and Pt(i) is the price of each good i in units of money. The transac-







t ,w h e r emt = Mt
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t)Pt.W e r e s t r i c t L0 < 0,a n d
L00 > 0.W ed e ﬁne the point of full liquidity as m
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=0 .T h i si m p l i e st h a tlC =0at that point.
2De Fiore and Teles (2002) argue that when there are consumption taxes it is reasonable
to assume, contrary to previous literature, that money is unit elastic with respect to the
price level gross of consumption taxes.
6At the end of the period, the households receive the labor income, WtNw
t ,
and the proﬁts from the ﬁrms
R 1
0 A(i)tΠ(i)tdi. The two sources of income
are taxed, respectively, at the rates τw
t and τd
t.








A(i)ta(i)tdi ≤ Wt (5)
























Initial nominal wealth, W
−
0 = W0 −
R 1
0 a(i)0di,i sg i v e n . W ea s s u m et h a t
initial nominal wealth is positive W
−
0 ≥ 0 a n dt h a ti tc a nb et a x e da tt h e
rate L ≤ 1. This will be equivalent to assuming that initial nominal wealth
is zero.






























































From these conditions we get Etzt+1 = 1
Rt+1.
7Firms In this economy there is a share 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 of ﬁrms that set prices
one period in advance. The remaining ﬁrms set prices contemporaneously.




where yt(i) is the production of good i and st is the aggregate technology
shock. yt(i) can be used for private and public consumption gt(i),s ot h a t
yt(i)=ct(i)+gt(i).
The problem of the ﬁrm is to choose the price in order to maximize proﬁts









as given, where Yt = Ct + Gt, and satisfying the technology constraint (14).
The demand is obtained from (8) and from (22).
The ﬁrms that can choose prices every period, at each date t maximize













Since the consumption tax is restricted to be τc
t ≥− 1, the maximization of
the nominal value of proﬁts also maximizes the value in units of consump-
tion. Since τd
t ≤ 1, the maximization of
(1−τd
t)
Rt Πt(i) is equivalent to the









The price is set equal to a constant mark-up over marginal cost.
We consider now the problem of the ﬁrms that set the prices one period
in advance. As of time t, the ﬁrms are constrained in terms of the price at
which they can sell, but are not constrained in terms of the quantity. Thus,
at time t, and given a previously chosen price, they do choose quantities to
maximize proﬁts. These ﬁrms sell the output on demand in period t as long








Rt Πt(i) ≥ 0. If that value was negative the ﬁrm would choose to produce
zero.3
3We make assumptions on the markup θ
(θ−1) and the magnitude of shocks to guarantee
that proﬁts when the ﬁrms sell the output on demand are non negative in every state.
8When ﬁrm i sets prices one period in advance, it solves the problem of










subject to (14) and (15).






























































Firms charge a mark-up over the expected value of a weighted marginal
cost, where the weights depend on the taxes, period t+1marginal utility of
leisure, the nominal wages, the nominal interest rates, and period toutput of
the sticky ﬁrms.













Given the prices on each good, Pt(i), the government minimizes expenditure









9A government policy consists of a sequence of government purchases, money











t=0, L. The following restrictions apply
to the nominal interest rates and tax rates: Rt ≥ 1, τc
t > −1, τw
t < 1, τd
t ≤ 1,
L ≤ 1.I fRt < 1, it would be possible to make inﬁnite proﬁts issuing debt
and holding money. If τc
t ≤− 1, the consumers would be able to purchase
an inﬁnite amount of consumption. If τw
t ≥ 1, labor supply would be zero.
If τd
t > 1, it would be optimal to minimize proﬁts, and if L > 1,h o u s e h o l d s
would dispose of the initial wealth.

















t +( 1− α)y
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t+1, for all possible states at t +1
A(i)t =1
3 Implementable allocations
In this section we characterize the sets of implementable allocations for the
diﬀerent degrees of price rigidity described by α.W e ﬁrst show that these
sets coincide in the two extreme environments, under ﬂexible and sticky
prices where α =0 ,1. Fiscal and monetary policies aﬀect the economy very
diﬀerently in the two environments. However, even if the nominal rigidity
neutralizes the eﬀect of taxes, as we will discuss in the next section, it gives
rise to the monetary non-neutrality that can be used to achieve the same set
of allocations as under ﬂexible prices.
In the intermediate case where the economy is composed of both ﬁrms
that set the prices contemporaneously and ﬁrms that set prices one period
in advance, for 0 < α < 1, the set of implementable allocations includes
10allocations where relative prices are distorted. However, these allocations are
not eﬃcient in the sense that they wouldn’t be chosen by a planner that
aims at maximizing a function of aggregate consumption and leisure. The
eﬃcient set of implementable allocations (frontier) coincides with the set of
allocations that can be implemented under ﬂexible or sticky prices. The
degree of price rigidity is thus irrelevant for the conduct of policy, in terms
of the allocations that can be achieved.
In order to characterize the set of implementable allocations, prices and
policies it is useful to manipulate the system equilibrium conditions above
and replace some of the equilibrium variables so that the equilibrium condi-
tions can be summarized.
From (16) and (18), and using the law of iterated expectations as well


































, j = f, s. Note that condition (26), for the sticky ﬁrms,
holds from period one on, so that there is no restriction on the value of the
real wages in the initial period.














Using the intratemporal condition (9) and the price setting condition (25)
we replace wt and w
f




















The set of implementable allocations must also include the intertemporal
























































uh(0) , obtained using (12),











































P0 . Using the intratemporal conditions (9) and (10)
to replace wt and Rt in the budget constraint, as well as (25) and (26), and
the fact that the transactions technology is homogeneous of degree k ≥ 0,






































































12The value of proﬁts from period one on is independent of the share of
sticky ﬁrms, since the value of proﬁts of the sticky ﬁr m si st h es a m ea s
the one of the ﬂexible ﬁrms. For a particular state, the proﬁts of both
ﬁrms will in general diﬀer, since the optimal pricing rule for sticky-price
ﬁrms allows for departures between the marginal productivity of labor and
real wages. However, the expected value of the real wage, weighed by the
state-contingent relative price of consumption must be equal to the expected
marginal productivity of labor, using the same weights. Those same state-
contingent relative prices of consumption also weigh the real wage in the
life-time budget constraint of households, resulting in the same value for
proﬁts.
At time zero, the prices of the sticky ﬁrms are arbitrarily given, so that
the constraint on the real wage (26) only holds from time one one. Because
the initial price is given, the government can use monetary policy to aﬀect
nominal wages and pin down the value for the real wage. This instrument is
not available when prices are ﬂexible, since the real wage must be equal to the
marginal productivity of labor. It turns out, however, that this instrument
is redundant, as will be shown.


































































t +( 1− α)y
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Then, from (32), (33) and (34), we have






)st (1 − ht − l(Ct,m t)) (35)







, respectively, in the other equilibrium conditions,
and obtain a system of equilibrium conditions that restrict the allocations











0 and P0. In the following
lemma we specify that system of equations:
Lemma 1 The restrictions on allocations {Ct,h t,m t} and on the alloca-











0 and P0,c a nb e
described by (26), (27) for t =0 , as well as (28), (29), (30), (31), and
the resource constraints, (32), (33) and (34).





, and (27) for t ≥ 1 c a nb eu s e dt or e c o v e r{τc
t, t ≥ 1}.
The restrictions on taxes and the restriction that proﬁts may not be negative,
established above, must also be satisﬁed.
In the extreme cases with only ﬂexible or sticky ﬁrms the sets of alloca-
tions deﬁned by the restrictions in Lemma 1 are the same. We state this in
the following lemma:
Lemma 2 The sets of implementable allocations coincide in the cases where
α =0and α =1 .
Proof: Under ﬂexible prices, when α =0 , the set of implementable






































together with the resource constraints
Ct + Gt = st (1 − ht − l(Ct,m t)). (38)
















































and the resources constraints (38). P0 is given.
The two restrictions are diﬀerent in the value of proﬁt sa n dw e a l t hi n
period zero. However, it is possible to use the instruments τd
t, τw
t , P0 under
ﬂexible prices, and τd
t, τw
t , w0 under sticky prices to achieve the same values
for initial wealth and initial proﬁts.¥
Under sticky prices, the real wage, wt,d o e sn o th a v et ob ee q u a lt oi t s
value under ﬂexible prices,
(θ−1)
θ st. Monetary and ﬁscal policy can aﬀect the
real wage at time 0,t h e r e b ya ﬀecting proﬁts and the real value of initial
wealth. On the other hand, under ﬂexible prices P0 can be chosen freely.
Using these diﬀerent instruments as well as the tax rates it is possible to
guarantee that the sets of implementable allocations are the same in the two
environments.
We now deﬁne the frontier of allocations:
15Deﬁnition 3 The frontier of implementable allocations is the subset of the
set of implementable allocations such that aggregate consumption is maxi-
mized for any value of leisure.
In the mixed economy with both ﬂexible and sticky ﬁrms, where 0 <
α < 1, the frontier of allocations coincides with the implementable set under
ﬂexible or sticky prices. The other allocations, that involve relative price
distortions, are interior allocations that would not be chosen by a government
with preferences on aggregate consumption and leisure.
The proposition follows:
Proposition 4 The set of (frontier) implementable allocations is indepen-
dent of the degree of price stickiness 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Proof:
We show that it is possible to determine a frontier of allocations for
{Ct,h t,m t} that is independent of α.




θ st, t ≥ 0,
the implementability conditions are described by (36) for P0 = Ps
0 together
with the resources constraints (38). These conditions are the same for any
0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
If, for a given 0 < α < 1, policy is conducted so that ws
t 6= w
f
t , the resource
constraints will be more restrictive but the other constraints will not. Indeed,
if the policy was such that ws
t 6= w
f
t , then the resources constraint (38) would





t ) < 1 iﬀ ws
t 6= w
f
t . The restriction on
the allocations {Ct,h t,m t} from implementability conditions (26), (27) for




since it is possible to pick τc
0 and τd
0 to attain the same values for initial proﬁts
and real wealth. If the preferences of the government depend only on {Ct,h t},




t .T h i s d e ﬁnes a frontier of allocations. This frontier is the
same for any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.¥
This result is an application of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) optimal
rules according to which it is not optimal to distort production in a second
best environment. In the proposition we have stated that it is eﬃcient to set
policy so that prices are the same across ﬂexible and sticky ﬁrms. This means
that the price level should not vary with the contemporaneous shocks, and












.W eh a v e
16stated in the proposition above a result of irrelevance of the price rigidity
in terms of the sets of implementable allocations. In the proposition and
corollary that follow we extend the irrelevance, or equivalence, result, to the
policies that decentralize the frontier set of allocations.
It is clear that the policies that decentralize the set of frontier allocations
i nt h ei n t e r m e d i a t ec a s ew h e r e0 < α < 1 are the same for any α.T h e ya r e
ﬁscal and monetary policies such that markups do not vary with the shocks
as under ﬂexible prices, and prices do not depend on the shocks as under
sticky prices. In other words, ﬁscal policy is conducted as if all prices were
ﬂexible; and monetary policy replicates the ﬂexible prices equilibrium. Gaps,
deﬁned as the deviations to the allocation under ﬂexible prices for a given
tax policy, are eliminated. Clearly these policies also decentralize the set of
implementable allocations in the environments with ﬂexible or sticky prices,
for α =0 ,1. The proposition follows:
Proposition 5 Let 0 < α < 1. For each allocation in the frontier set of
allocations, if a policy decentralizes that allocation for some α, then it de-
centralizes the same allocation for every α. The policy also decentralizes the
same allocation for α =0 ,1.
Corollary 6 (Adao, Correia and Teles, 1999)4 The optimal (Ramsey) poli-
cies do not depend on the alfas.
The frontier of allocations achieved by following a policy that equates real




θ st, t ≥ 0, is only a partial characterization
of the relevant set of implementable allocations for any government that aims
at maximizing a function of aggregate consumption and leisure. Further
restrictions have to be imposed on the tax instruments in order to fully
characterize the frontier set of implementable allocations. In particular it
is also a frontier requirement that proﬁts be fully taxed and the nominal
interest rate be set according to the Friedman rule. We proceed to show this.
The choices of τd
t and mt are independent of government preferences.
Because proﬁts cannot be negative, it is optimal to tax proﬁts completely,
and set τd
t =1 .S i n c ef o rτd
t =1the production decisions are indeterminate,
4Adao, Correia and Teles (1999) consider a model with either sticky prices or sticky
portfolios. They show that in each environment, the policies that replicate the ﬂexible
economy are independent of the rigidity. In this sense, they claim that the monetary
transmission mechanism is irrelevant for policy.
17we consider the limiting economies as τd
t approaches one. In the limit, the
government can decentralize the same allocation as in the perfect competition
case.
The optimal choice for real balances mt that satisﬁes the frontier im-
plementability conditions (36), with τd
t =1 , and (38) is characterized for
t ≥ 1 by
−lm(t)[ϕ(k − 1)uh(t)+λtst]=0 , t ≥ 1
where ϕ and λt are the multipliers, respectively, of (36) and (38). The solu-
tion for t ≥ 1 is, thus,
−lm(t)=0 , t ≥ 1
For t =0 , the slope of the lagrangian is positive,











since lm(0) ≤ 0, lmm(0) ≥ 0, [ϕ(k − 1)uh(0) + λ0s0] > 0,5 and since we
assumed that W
−
0 ≥ 0. Thus also in this case the optimal solution is lm(0) =
0.
The eﬃcient solution is decentralized with the Friedman rule, Rt =1 .
This result was obtained, for the deterministic case, by De Fiore and Teles
(1998). They extend the results in Correia and Teles (1996) to the case
where the policy instruments include consumption taxes. The result is in
contrast with Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1996) and Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2000). Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1996) use the speciﬁcation of
the transactions technology proposed by Kimbrough (1986) that was not re-
stricted to exhibit unitary elasticity of money with respect to the price level
gross of consumption taxes. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2000) don’t allow for
complete taxation of proﬁts and/or for consumption taxes. In their set up,
the inﬂation tax replaces the consumption tax with an eﬃciency loss.
Because the choice of real money balances is indeterminate when Rt =1 ,
we consider the limiting case as Rt approaches one.
The solution for real money at time zero would have been simpliﬁed if
we had imposed to start with the eﬃciency requirement that initial wealth
be fully taxed, L =1. An approximate way to achieve this full tax on the
initial nominal wealth is to set the consumption tax τc
0 e q u a lt oav e r yl a r g e
number.
5See Correia and Teles (1996) for the proof of the sign of this term.
18Once we impose the eﬃciency requirements speciﬁed in this section, the





t {uC(t)Ct − uh(t)(1− ht)} =0 (40)
and the resource constraints
Ct + Gt = st (1 − ht). (41)
4 Minimal sets of instruments
In the last section we have established that, independently of the degree of
price rigidity, the planner can use ﬁscal and monetary policy to implement
the same set of allocations. In this sense, the environments with ﬂexible
a n ds t i c k yp r i c e s ,o rw i t hb o t ht y p e so fﬁrms, are equivalent; or, in other
words, the degree of price rigidity is irrelevant in determining the set of im-
plementable allocations. The result was obtained under the assumption that
the government has access to taxes on consumption, labor income, proﬁts,
initial wealth, and that it can issue state-contingent nominal debt. It turns
out that not all these instruments are necessary. In this section we determine
the minimal sets of instruments in the extreme environments with ﬂexible
and sticky prices and in the intermediate case with both types of ﬁrms. We
also extend the result of equivalence or irrelevance of environments to the
choice of ﬁscal and monetary policies.
We ﬁrst discuss the decentralization of the frontier allocations described
by (40) and (41) for the intermediate case with 0 < α < 1.T h i s f r o n t i e r
of allocation requires that the tax on proﬁts and the initial levy are set at
their maximum levels, and that the nominal interest rate is Rt =1 .F o r
each allocation we can recover the prices, the other taxes, the debt and
monetary policies that support the allocation using the following equilibrium

























































t)Ptmt = Mt, t ≥ 0 (46)











t ≥ 0. If, by assumption, only one of those taxes is available, then it is deter-
mined uniquely. The intertemporal condition (43) restricts the average level




t−1)Pt−1.C o n -





t ≥ 0. From (46), we obtain Mt
(1+τc
t)Pt, t ≥ 0. Not all the policy instruments
that we have assumed to be available are necessary to decentralize the set
of implementable allocations. In particular, as we will show in this section,
nominal state-contingent public debt is not necessary. Real state-contingent
debt can be achieved with state-noncontingent nominal debt, through the
variability of the price level gross of consumption taxes. One of the taxes,
on consumption or labor income, may also be redundant.
If the policy instruments include consumption taxes, labor income taxes
and state-contingent public debt, the policies will not be uniquely pinned
down. Let Φt be the number of states at time t ≥ 0,w i t hΦ0 =1 .F o r
t =0 ,s i n c eL =1 , there are only two equations to determine three variables
{τc
0,τw
0 ,M 0}. If the levy was not set at its maximum value, the same role
c o u l db ep l a y e db yτc





0)P0 =0 . τw
0 is determined using the intratemporal condition (42) and
M0 is determined using (46). For t ≥ 1 there are 3Φt + Φt−1 equations to




t } and {Pt}.
The indeterminacy indicates that not all the policy instruments are nec-
essary to decentralize the allocations. Since we allow for the initial levy there
20is an equivalence between the consumption and labor income taxes for all pe-
riods. If only one of those taxes is used the policy variables will be uniquely
determined. In period 0 there will be two equations to determine two vari-
ables and, for t ≥ 1, 3Φt +Φt−1 equations to determine 3Φt +Φt−1 variables.
For example, if there are no labor income taxes, then (42) determines {τc
t}
for any date and state; from (43), we obtain {Pt} for any t ≥ 1 and P0 is










The use of both consumption and labor income taxes can play the role of
state-contingent debt in the decentralization of the set of frontier allocations.
With state-noncontingent debt and both consumption and labor income taxes
t h e r ei ss t i l lo n ed e g r e eo fi n d e t e r m i n a c ya tt =0 ; and for t ≥ 1 there
are 3Φt + Φt−1 equations to determine 3Φt +2 Φt−1 variables, {τc
t,τw





,s ot h a tΦt−1 is the degree of indeterminacy. In this case state-
contingent real debt is simulated with the variability of the consumption tax.
The average value of consumption taxes, τc
t,i sn o td e t e r m i n e d .T h u sn e i t h e r
is the average labor income tax, τw
t and Mt. This indeterminacy also implies
the indeterminacy of Pt and B
g
t−1.
To summarize, in order to decentralize the frontier set of allocations, the
government will need to use as minimal sets of instruments either both con-















. In the latter case the policy variables are
not determined uniquely. The three minimal sets of instruments are equiv-
alent sets, in the sense that they are alternative policy instruments that
decentralize the same set of allocations.
We the following section we consider the extreme cases where either all
ﬁrms set prices contemporaneously or they all set prices in advance. In
those cases it is possible to restrict further the policy instruments and still
implement the same set of allocations.
In each extreme environment, the set of policies that decentralize each
allocation is larger than in the mixed economy. In particular, under sticky
prices, even if there are only consumption taxes, or labor income taxes, they
are not uniquely pinned down. In this sense there is short-run neutrality
of taxes which is analogous to the neutrality of money under ﬂexible prices.
Under ﬂexible prices, there are many money supply policies that decentralize
the same allocation. Either this neutrality or the equivalence of the con-
sumption and labor income tax is lost if debt is not state-contingent. This
means that either the price level or the variability of the consumption tax
21are pinned down when public debt is state-noncontingent.
The neutrality of taxes under sticky prices is also lost when public debt is
not state-contingent. In fact real state-contingent debt can be simulated with
variability of consumption taxes. As we saw, both the neutrality of money
and the neutrality of taxes are not present in the mixed economy. Tax and
monetary policy must be conducted in a single way so that there are no
surprises in prices or mark ups. When public debt is not state-contingent,
the variability of the consumption tax and labor income tax are also pinned
down.
4.1 Flexible prices
I nt h ec a s ew h e r ea l lﬁrms set prices contemporaneously, for each allocation
in the set of implementable allocations, we can recover the taxes, the debt
and monetary policies, as well as the prices, that support that allocation
using the equilibrium conditions above, except that Pt c a nd e p e n do nt h e











, t ≥ 1 (47)
that replaces (43).
The number of equations is the same but there are now Φt price levels to
d e t e r m i n ei ne a c hp e r i o di n s t e a do fΦt−1. The minimal sets of instruments
in this case where all prices are ﬂexible are smaller sets. In particular, there
is no need to issue state-contingent public debt or use consumption taxes
(or, alternatively, labor income taxes). If neither of these two instruments







and prices {Pt} are
uniquely pinned down, except at t =0for L =1 . From (42), τw
t is determined
in each date and state. At t =0 , unless L6 =1 , it is not possible to use (44) to







are jointly determined by (44) and (47). Mt, t ≥ 1,
is determined using (46). The intertemporal condition determines average
inﬂation, and the budget constraints determine how inﬂation is distributed
across states.
Alternatively, if, instead of labor income taxes, consumption taxes were







and the price levels {Pt} would also
be uniquely determined, again except for t =0when L =1 .













. In both cases, the price level variability
replicates real state-contingent debt.
The role for the price level of replicating state-contingent real debt can be
played by consumption taxes, if both labor income and consumption taxes
are used. In this case, when debt is state-noncontingent, the price level gross
of consumption taxes, (1+τc
t)Pt, t ≥ 1, is uniquely pinned down. For t ≥ 1,




Mt for t ≥ 1, is also uniquely determined, from (46).
The fact that the sequences of the price level gross of consumption taxes
and the money supply are determined means that money is not neutral in this
ﬂexible price economy, where the government does not issue state-contingent
debt. Money supply is playing a role, replacing the lack of a policy instru-
ment, according to a ”ﬁscal theory of the price level gross of consumption
taxes”.
When the set of policy instruments includes state-contingent public debt,
in addition to the taxes on consumption or labor income, there are multiple
paths for the money supply, {Mt}, corresponding to multiple paths for the
price level gross of consumption taxes, {(1 + τc
t)Pt}. Average inﬂation, for
the price level gross of taxes, is determined by the intertemporal condition,
(47), but the variability of the price level gross of taxes, and money supply,
are not pinned down. This is the case whether only one of the taxes or both
are considered. The multiple policies are equivalent policies that exhibit a
(ﬁscal) neutrality of money under ﬂexible prices.
When the set of policy instruments includes state-contingent public debt,
or when both consumption and labor income taxes are used, so that the price
level is not pinned down, then there is one money supply, tax and debt policy
such that the prices are predetermined, as under sticky prices. The variability
of the price level gross of consumption taxes required to reproduce real state-
contingent debt would result from variability of the consumption tax, and
labor income tax, alone. With these policies it is possible to decentralize the
same frontier set of allocations for 0 < α < 1.
The issue of whether state-contingent public debt is necessary to decen-
tralize the Ramsey allocation under ﬂexible prices was addressed by Chari,
Christiano and Kehoe (1991). They show that it is possible to decentralize
the second best allocation in an equilibrium where the price level reacts to
shocks so as to replicate state-contingent real debt. In their calibrated exer-
cise the volatility of the price level is very high. Questioning the relevance of
23this policy recommendation, Siu (2000) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001)
compute the Ramsey solution when it is costly to change prices. They show
that the beneﬁts of replicating state-contingent debt are minimal relatively to
the costs of changing prices. As the discussion above makes clear this trade-
oﬀ is artiﬁcial since it hinges on the assumption that consumption taxes are
not available. If consumption taxes were available, they could be used to
replicate real state-contingent debt in an equilibrium where the price level
is constant across states. Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991) also assume
that there are only labor income taxes. However in their ﬂexible price world,
consumption taxes would be redundant. That is not the case under sticky
prices.
4.2 Sticky prices
Under sticky prices there are only Φt−1 price levels to determine in each
period, but there are also less equilibrium conditions that can be used to
recover the policy variables. When all the ﬁrms set prices one period in
advance, the Φt intratemporal conditions (42) are replaced by Φt−1 conditions





















 =0 , t ≥ 1
(48)
This means that the intratemporal conditions only restrict an average of the




t ). The other relevant equilibrium conditions are the
same as in the intermediate cases, (43), (44), and (46). The initial price level,
P0,i sg i v e n .




t} and {Pt} are uniquely determined, except for t =0
when the initial wealth is fully taxed. For t ≥ 1,t h e r ea r e2Φt +2 Φt−1









The intratemporal condition, (48), determines an average value for the
consumption tax, τc
t. The budget constraints, (44), determine how the tax
is distributed across states, as well as the level of public debt, B
g
t.G i v e nt h e
consumption tax in the diﬀerent states, the intertemporal condition, (43),
can be used to determine the price level, Pt. The money supply, Mt,c a nb e
24recovered using (46˙ ). Since the price level cannot depend on the state, in
order to replicate real state-contingent debt, the consumption tax will vary
across states. From Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991), we would expect
the variability of the tax rate that implements the Ramsey allocation to be
very high. This variability of the tax rate is not distortionary since only the
average tax rate matters.
If instead of consumption taxes, labor income taxes were used, then it
would not be possible to decentralize the same set of allocations, unless public
debt was state-contingent. This is clear since it would not be possible to




on the contemporaneous shocks.
If public debt is state-contingent, the consumption taxes are only pinned
















, associated with the same real al-
location. One of the tax policies would satisfy (42), as under ﬂexible prices.
Whenever the tax policy is diﬀerent from this, the real wage deviates from
the one under ﬂexible prices, according to (9), in order to compensate for the
deviations in the tax policy. In this case we can say that there are gaps, de-
ﬁned as the deviations between the sticky price and ﬂexible price allocations
for a given tax policy.
In this case where the public debt is state-contingent, there is a short-run
neutrality of taxes, under sticky prices, analogous to the neutrality of money
under ﬂexible prices. As in that case, the neutrality disappears when there
is no state-contingent debt, since consumption taxes will be replacing that
missing policy instrument.
4.3 Other restrictions on policy instruments
In this section we analyze the implications of restricting the consumption and
labor income taxes not to depend on the contemporaneous shocks. Thus,
taxes are set in advance as prices are. We also consider restrictions on the
taxation of proﬁts and initial wealth.
We have seen above that the restriction on the public debt that it may
not be state-contingent is not relevant since it can be replaced by the use of
other ﬁscal instruments. We now inquire of the relevance of the constraint
that taxes may not depend on the contemporaneous shocks. In order to dis-
cuss this we are going to concentrate on the Ramsey allocations. We state
25the conditions under which it is optimal for a Ramsey planner to set propor-
tionate distortions, or wedges, that are independent of the contemporaneous
shocks. Under those conditions the constraint is not binding.
When the restriction is imposed that taxes may not depend on the con-
temporaneous shocks, in the extreme case of sticky prices, α =1 ,i ti ss t i l l
possible to use state dependent monetary policy to achieve an optimal solu-
tion characterized by state dependent proportionate distortions. Monetary
policy plays the role of state-contingent taxes under ﬂexible prices. The op-
timal allocation is characterized by gaps. For α 6=1 , unless the optimal
solution is characterized by proportionate distortions that do not depend on
the contemporaneous shocks, it cannot be attained.
In general, the equivalence of environments in terms of the optimal allo-
cations and policies is lost when the restriction is imposed that taxes do not
depend on the contemporaneous shocks. Adao, Correia and Teles (2001) is
an example of this principle. Since they only consider monetary policy there
is a natural restriction on policy, that the nominal interest rate cannot be
negative. For this reason the set of allocations under ﬂexible prices is smaller
that the set of allocations under sticky prices. In that paper, conditions are
provided under which the optimal solution belongs to both sets. In general
it doesn’t.
When α 6=1 , and taxes must be set in advance, if the optimal solution is
characterized by wedges that depend on the contemporaneous shocks, then
the second best cannot be achieved. The third best will be characterized by
deviations from the ﬂexible price allocation and policies.
In the following subsection we provide the conditions under which it is
optimal to set proportionate distortions that do not vary with the contem-
poraneous shocks.
4.3.1 Sticky taxes
In this section we describe the conditions under which it is optimal to smooth
proportionate distortions. The objective is to assess the relevance of imposing
the same restriction on taxes as the restriction on the setting of prices, that
they may not depend on the contemporaneous shocks.











26and the resources constraint
Ct + Gt = st (1 − ht)
We want to determine under what conditions the optimal proportionate
distortions, or wedges,
uC(Ct,ht)st
uh(Ct,ht) , do not depend on the contemporaneous
shocks. From the FOC of Ramsey problem, where utility (1) is maximized
























where ϕ is the multiplier of the implementability condition (40).
The optimal wedges
uC(t)
uh(t)st do not depend on the contemporaneous shocks
when the preferences are separable and have constant elasticities of the mar-
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st(1−ht) does not depend on the contemporaneous shock, then the optimal
labor allocations won’t either, and neither will the optimal wedges.
Therefore it is optimal to set taxes that do not depend on the contem-
poraneous shocks when preferences are separable and constant elasticity in
consumption and labor or when preferences are consistent with balanced
growth and government expenditures shocks are perfectly correlated with
the productivity shock. For the ﬁrst case it is still possible to establish an
equivalence of environments in what concerns the policies that decentralize
the optimal allocations provided that state-contingent debt is available. In
the second case, the same equivalence is established without that require-
ment.
4.3.2 Taxes on proﬁts and initial wealth
Suppose that for some arbitrary reason the taxes on proﬁts and initial wealth
were bounded away from one. Would the equivalence result still hold for the
same minimal sets of instruments? The answer is no if the sets of instruments




t } and {τc
t,M t,Z
g
t }, and yes if the instruments are both








. In the latter case the
remaining degrees of indeterminacy could be used for the purpose of fully
taxing proﬁts and initial wealth, so that the same frontier set of allocations
could be implemented with the same policies independently of the degree of
rigidity.
In order to achieve the frontier allocations the consumption tax, and also
the labor tax, and nominal debt, would have to be arbitrarily large. The tax
on consumption would be replicating the tax on proﬁts that is ruled out by
assumption. If the same restrictions imposed on the direct taxes on proﬁts
and wealth were to apply to the alternative means of achieving the same
goal, then the equivalence result would hold in general.
If we were to impose restrictions not on the tax rates but on the net of



































































t {uC(t)Ct − uh(t)(1− ht − (1 − k)l(t))} = Π + W,
together with the resource constraints (41) and would not depend on α.T h e
new frontier of allocations would be less eﬃcient.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In this paper we analyze the implications of nominal rigidities for the conduct
of ﬁscal and monetary policy in response to shocks.
We ﬁnd that the sets of implementable allocations are the same under
ﬂexible and sticky prices. Each allocation can be decentralized with a com-
mon policy to both environments. Under ﬂexible prices, money supply policy
is conducted so that there are no surprises in prices. Under sticky prices, ﬁs-
cal policy is conducted so that there are no surprises in mark ups. In each
environment there are other policies that decentralize the same allocation.
In particular, under sticky prices, tax policy is not uniquely pinned down.
This means that there is short-run neutrality of taxes, which is analogous
to the neutrality of money under ﬂexible prices. Thus, both under ﬂexible
prices and under sticky prices, there are neutral and non neutral ﬁscal and
monetary instruments. The roles are reversed across environments.
29In the mixed economy with both ﬂexible and sticky ﬁrms, taxation and
monetary policies are pinned down. It is possible to determine a frontier
where ﬁscal and monetary policies are conducted so that there are no sur-
prises in prices and mark ups. The frontier is independent of the share of
sticky ﬁrms and the policies that decentralize those allocations are also in-
dependent of the share of sticky ﬁrms. Because the frontier allocations and
policies are independent of the degree of rigidity, it is possible to use the re-
sults on optimal taxation under ﬂexible prices as in Lucas and Stokey (1983),
Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991), or Zhu (1992).
We characterize further the set of frontier allocations by showing that,
independently of the degree of price stickiness, that set is characterized by
the Friedman rule, of zero nominal interest rates, and by full taxation of
proﬁts and initial wealth.
We address the issue of which are the minimal sets of instruments that
allow us to obtain the results of equivalence of environments. In particular,
we show that in contrast to Siu (2000) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001),
the equivalence results still hold when public debt is assumed to be state-
noncontingent. In the same way that under ﬂexible prices the volatility of the
price level can simulate state-contingent real debt, in this environment where
price level volatility is costly, high volatility of consumption and income taxes
can serve the same purpose.
In this paper we also analyze the conditions for optimal smoothing of
proportionate distortions, or wedges. This is relevant since, under those
conditions, we can assume that taxes are set in advance and yet obtain the
result that the nominal rigidity is not relevant for the conduct of optimal
policy.
The degree of price rigidity is assumed to be exogenous. This is not a
natural assumption when computing the eﬃcient, or optimal, policies. How-
ever, since we obtain that the sets of eﬃcient policies do not depend on the
degree of stickiness, exogeneity of the degree of stickiness is not a drawback.
The results in this paper hold under staggered price setting (or Rotem-
berg, 1982) if the transactions technology was described by a cash-in-advance
constraint instead of the assumed transactions technology. In that case it
would be feasible to replicate the ﬂexible price allocation with a nominal
interest rate path that follows the path of the real interest rate under ﬂexi-
b l ep r i c e s ,a n dw i t hz e r oi n ﬂation. The distortion from the nominal interest
rate being diﬀerent from zero could be compensated by a lower consump-
tion or income tax, and the nominal interest rate wouldn’t cause additional
30distortions.
The equivalence of environments in terms of the sets of implementable
allocations would be lost if we were to consider idiosyncratic shocks. The
sets of allocations would, obviously, depend on the degree of price rigidity.
However the sets of policies would not. In this stricter sense there is still an
irrelevance of environments.
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